American social movements are often bitterly divided about whether their objectives are achieved better by working with one of the major political parties or by operating independently. These divisions are consequential for how social movements and political parties respond to one another. First, differing partisan attitudes shape the structure of activist networks, leading activists to join organizations with others who share their party loyalties or disloyalties. Second, partisan attitudes affect how activists participate in the movement, with strong partisans more likely to embrace institutional tactics, such as lobbying. Third, partisanship affects activists' access to the institutions of government, such as Congress. Relying on surveys of antiwar activists attending large-scale public demonstrations in 2004 and 2005 and a Capitol Hill Lobby Day in September 2005, the authors argue that some activists integrate into major party networks through the "party in the street," an arena of significant party-movement interaction.
The merits and demerits of the Democratic Party are frequent topics of discussion among antiwar activists. The movement consists of many people who are loyal to (but frustrated with) the Democratic Party, those who identify with third parties (like the Green Party or the Communist Party), and those who reject the system of political parties altogether, including individuals formally loyal to the Democratic Party (N. Allen & Brox, 2005) . These activists agree, nonetheless, that they are not Republicans, who are almost nonexistent within the movement. Like it or not, their moral and political struggles are within or against the Democratic Party; its actions and inactions construct opportunities for and barriers to the achievement of their issue-specific policy goals. These observations point to the central question of our article: What is the nature of the relationship between the Democratic Party and the antiwar movement in the United States?
Scholarly research on political parties and social movements provides little guidance on how parties and movements interrelate within the contemporary American context. Comparative research on multiparty democracies in Europe has documented that "movement parties" arise when "coalitions of political activists…emerge from social movements and try to apply the organizational and strategic practices of social movements in the arena of party competition" (Kitschelt, 2006, p. 280 ; see also Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Kitschelt, 1989) . Multiparty systems sometimes allow those movements to find a party home, which has been the case for the Green Parties of Germany, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. In the United States, however, the imperatives of the two-party system and the limited success of third parties have made it very difficult for social movements to dominate political party organizations since the beginning of the twentieth century (Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1996) . Accordingly, American politics scholars have tended to divide research on parties and movements into separate fields of study (for notable exceptions, see Babb, 1996; Banaszak, 1996; Clemens, 1997; Clifton, 2004; Van Dyke, 2003; and Young 1996) .
We argue that social movements and American political parties often interact in significant and consequential ways. Although many issue activists prefer to work outside of the party system or to turn to third parties, others recognize the potential to achieve their objectives through one or both of the major parties. Considering the case of the contemporary antiwar movement, we investigate three types of interaction. First, we examine whether partisan loyalties and nonpartisan attitudes help to structure the network of movement activists and organizations. Second, we consider whether partisan loyalties and nonpartisan attitudes affect the ways that activists participate in the movement. Third, we test whether partisan organization within Congress affects the access that movement activists have (or fail to have) to decision makers. Our observation of antiwar events and surveys of antiwar activists at major protests held between August 2004 and September 2005 leads us to answer each of these questions in the affirmative. We conclude that the intersecting network of parties and social movements is a "party in the street," which shapes the strategies of social movements and political parties.
Parties and the Strategies of Social Movements
During the nineteenth century, American social movements often found a meaningful place within third parties when they were stymied by major party politics. For instance, the debate about slavery spawned a plethora of third parties, two of which (the Free Soil Party and the Liberty Party) eventually found a home within the nascent Republican Party (Rosenstone et al., 1996) . Not long thereafter, factional movements by farmers and laborers were transformed into the Greenback and People's parties (Babb, 1996; Rosenstone et al., 1996) . Third-party efforts reflected a common belief by movement leaders that they could achieve their political ends through these institutions.
By the late nineteenth century, movement activists had become increasingly frustrated with their inability to reform the political system through partisan means (Scarrow, 1999) . As the two-party system became more stable and regionalized, it grew progressively difficult for third parties to influence the outcomes of elections. To compensate, movement leaders invented a new form of political organization-the interest group-that focused on direct lobbying of the legislature (Clemens, 1997) . Rather than attempt to form new political parties, then, social movements began to institutionalize as interest groups. For example, the civil rights and women's movements of the 1960s focused their energies into organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Organization for Women (NOW), respectively, rather than into a Black Party or a Women's Party (Costain, 1981; McAdam, 1982) . Indeed, all of the so-called "third party" presidential campaigns of the twentieth century were really "third person" campaigns (e.g., Roosevelt, Anderson, Perot, Nader), rather than the result of social movements (Rosenstone et al., 1996) .
The creation of new interest groups was the primary institutional outlet for the social movements of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, such as the environmental movement, the consumer movement, and the civil rights movement (Berry, 1999) . Many activists, nonetheless, are dissatisfied by the limits of interest group influence. Interest groups, after all, cannot realistically expect to compete with political parties for the control of government (Schattschneider, 1960 ). An additional strategy is for movements to become an organized constituency interest within a party, as was the case of the labor movement within the Democratic Party during the 1960s (Greenstone, 1969) . The Christian Right movement similarly became an organized constituency interest within the Republican Party in the 1980s and 1990s (V. H. Allen, 2007; Clifton, 2004; Oldfield, 1996) . The principal advantage of organizing within the existing party structure is that the social movement may be able to exert disproportionate sway over the decisions of national leaders. The disadvantage of this approach is that the movement may quickly find itself captured or co-opted by the party establishment (Frymer, 1999; Hirano & Snyder, 2007) .
Clearly, there is no optimal strategy for contemporary social movement leaders vis-à-vis political parties. The major parties have massive financial resources and access to the institutions of power that other kinds of political organizations cannot hope to possess. Unlike third parties, they have a realistic chance of winning elections and the potential to change the direction of policy. Thus, joining forces with a political party may allow a social movement to make a difference. Yet the electoral concerns of the major parties draw their issue positions toward the center of the political spectrum, away from the views of the social movement (Downs, 1957) . Participating in a major party's organization may force a movement to agree to a seemingly endless series of compromises on its core issues. Furthermore, partisan activity may draw energy and resources away from a movement's own organizational maintenance (Walker, 1983) .
The lack of a single optimal strategy induces heterogeneity in the approaches of movement activists and organizations. Some actors choose to embrace partisanship, whereas others opt for a nonpartisan or third-party course. These differences become significant points of contention among activists, leading to disputes such as whether to become involved in elections (Blee & Currier, 2006) and how to frame issues (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Heaney & Rojas, 2006; Maney, Woehrle, & Coy, 2005; Stone, 1989; Strolovitch, 2006) . We contend that these divisions play an important role in structuring the activities of the social movement and the response by the political parties.
Given the tensions between social movements and American political parties, the expression of partisanship by some activists may have a profound effect on the politics of a movement and the receptiveness of political parties. This article examines three hypotheses about the nature of this effect. First, we hypothesize that differing partisan attitudes shape activist networks. McPherson and Rotolo (1996) document that individuals seek to participate in organizations in which they are similar to other members of the group (see also Finifter, 1974) . These similarities become the basis not only for group membership but also for the interorganizational connections that form the basis of networks and alliances (Heaney, 2004) . Networks play a critical role in the ability of movement actors to mobilize resources, to seize opportunities, and to act collectively (Rucht, 2004) . Thus, we expect that certain movement organizations disproportionately recruit or attract partisans, whereas others find that they are more hospitable to nonpartisans, and that these organizations form clusters within activist networks with other like-minded organizations.
Second, we hypothesize that partisan attitudes affect the ways that activists participate in the social movement. Partisan identifications socialize citizens to respect political institutions and mold their relationships within the polity (Dalton & Weldon, 2007; Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2002; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993) . Individuals with strong partisan orientations are more likely to engage with formal political institutions by voting and making campaign contributions than those with nonpartisan (or weak partisan) orientations, though they are no more likely to contribute their time or to engage in political discussion (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, p. 358) . Thus, we expect that strong partisans in a social movement are more likely to participate in institutional political activity, such as lobbying, than are those unaffiliated with one of the major parties.
Third, we hypothesize that partisanship affects the ability of activists to gain access to the institutions of government. Elected political leaders consult with outside groups when they believe that these meetings will provide reliable information about the preferences of their constituents in the next election (Hansen, 1991) . In these cases, meetings with grassroots activists may convince leaders to recalibrate their policy positions in line with constituent preferences. When elected leaders anticipate that outside groups are unlikely to be representative of their core constituencies or that meeting with them could be politically damaging, then they are more likely to avoid contact with the groups. Thus, we expect that movement activists may enjoy access to elected representatives from a party if they see the goals of a social movement as consonant with the party's interests.
In the following sections, we test these three hypotheses with data drawn from our observations of the American antiwar movement from August 2004 to September 2005. We attended (or we sent surrogates to) all of the large-scale antiwar protests in the United States during this period. We administered surveys to participants at these rallies and gathered information at the Capitol Hill Lobby Day on September 26, 2005, which was the first of its kind sponsored by the present-day antiwar movement. The results of our analysis underscore the implications of partisanship and nonpartisanship for the nature of the movement-party connection.
Structuring the Antiwar Network
We argue that partisan attitudes are a key factor that helps to structure the antiwar network. In this section, we test this hypothesis using data from surveys of antiwar protesters conducted during a 1-year period. We discuss the contemporary history of the antiwar movement, present our methods and data analysis, and explain the implications of partisanship for the movement.
Origins of the Antiwar Movement
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , opened a new chapter, not only in American foreign policy, but also in the organization of the American Left. The attention of activists on the Left had long been divided among myriad causes, such as environmentalism, globalization, racism, gay rights, abortion rights, the death penalty, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The response of President George W. Bush to the events of September 11 soon redirected attention from these causes toward antiterrorism policies. The first major post-9/11 protests, held in San Francisco and Washington, DC, on September 29, 2001, were sponsored by International ANSWER (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism), an organization that emerged from the fusion of elements of the antiglobalization movement and the Workers World Party (ANSWER, 2007) .
As long as the Bush Administration's military agenda remained focused on the war in Afghanistan, the size of the antiwar movement remained relatively small. However, once the administration began to express intentions to invade Iraq, support for the movement grew (Meyer & Corrigall-Brown, 2005) . Other organizations, such as Win Without War, MoveOn.org, and Code Pink: Women for Peace, joined the movement (Cortright, 2004) . United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ) was formed on October 25, 2002, as a coalition of 70 organizations opposed to war on Iraq (United for Peace and Justice, 2007) . These organizations collaborated in coordinating a global day of protest on February 15, 2003 , which involved more than 790 demonstrations worldwide (United for Peace and Justice, 2007) . After the U.S.-Iraq War began on March 20, 2003 , they continued to sponsor numerous large-scale antiwar demonstrations, such as those held on March 22, 2003; October 23, 2003; and March 20, 2004 (the first anniversary of the war).
Data Collection
We began to observe the antiwar movement systematically in August 2004, after it had reached a point of organizational maturity. For a 1-year period, we (or our surrogates) conducted surveys of participants at all of the large-scale antiwar protests held in the United States. We attended five events: (a) the protest outside the Republican National Convention in New York City on August 29, 2004, which drew an estimated crowd of more than 500,000 people (McFadden, 2004) ; (b) the counter-inaugural protest in Washington, DC, on January 20, 2005; (c) antiwar rallies held to commemorate the second anniversary of the Iraq War on March 19-20, 2005 (Dvorak, 2005) .
We administered a 1-page survey at each event, with the exception of the September 24-26, 2005, event, where we also administered a second page of questions. 1 The one-page survey gathered data on age, sex, race, place of residence, partisan identification, electoral participation, organizational memberships and contacts, source of information, and reasons for participating in the event. The second page focused on respondent involvement with, and attitudes toward, political parties.
We drew nonprobability samples of participants at each event while taking aggressive measures to minimize sampling biases because of nonrandomness. We hired teams of surveyors, who spanned out geographically across the crowds. Each surveyor was instructed first to choose an individual from the crowd to serve as an "anchor" for selection. The anchor was not approached by the surveyor or invited to participate in the study. Second, the surveyor counted five individuals in a line from the anchor and invited the fifth person to participate in the survey. The surveyor then counted five persons from that individual and made another invitation. The process continued until three respondents accepted surveys. The surveyor allowed all three persons to complete the surveys and then moved forward in the crowd to identify a new anchor. Although there may be biases in our initial selection of the anchors because of the spatial grouping of activists, we expect that these biases are reduced substantially by selecting only individuals close to the anchors (rather than the anchors themselves) and by distributing the surveyors widely throughout the crowd. The response rate to the survey was a favorably high 89%. 2 In this section, we examine responses to two questions. First, respondents were asked, "Do you consider yourself to be a member of a political party? If 'yes', which parties are you a member of?" and "Were you contacted to attend today by any particular organization? If 'yes,' which organizations? (List as many as contacted you.)" The answers to these questions in 2,529 surveys compose our data on the organizations that contacted people to attend antiwar protests and the partisan identifications of those contacted individuals.
Data Analysis
The survey data reveal the partisan identifications of individuals attending protest events, along with the organizations that contacted them. We find that 40% of the activists within the antiwar movement describe themselves as Democrats, 39% identify as independents (i.e., they list no party affiliation), 20% claim membership in a third party, and only 2% belong to the Republican Party. These results reflect a high degree of loyalty to the Democratic Party, a willingness to embrace alternative political parties, and a nearly complete rejection of the Republican Party.
We examine the relationship between individual partisanship and the structure of the antiwar movement in Table 1 , which lists the 20 leading organizations in the movement, along with the partisan identifications of those they contacted. Our 2,529 respondents received exactly 1,000 contacts from organizations, with 31% of respondents being contacted by at least one organization. 3 Only a handful of national organizations contact a large number of people, with UFPJ, International ANSWER, MoveOn.org, and Code Pink topping the list. Many of the smaller contacting organizations were local peace groups that forwarded on the information they received from national organizations.
For the largest organizations in the movement, we are able to ascertain the partisan leanings of their adherents. We conducted t tests to determine whether the percentage of Democrats in the organization differed from the percentage in the movement as a whole. The two leading organizations, UFPJ and ANSWER, closely approximated the partisan composition of the movement as a whole, with 42% and 40% Democrats, respectively. The third Figure 1 ), the Progressive Democrats of America (PDA), the North Carolina Peace and Justice Coalition (NCJPC), and the Democratic Party itself. 4 These organizations all have constituencies who support the Democratic Party, enabling them to slant their work toward explicitly partisan causes. MoveOn.org, for example, openly works with Democratic organizations and politicians, such as former Vice President Al Gore and Senator Russ Feingold (MoveOn.org, 2007) . PDA aims to "create local 'homes,' chapters, and caucuses inside existing Democratic Party structures at the state and local level" (PDA, 2007, p. 2) . The partisan goals of these organizations are reflected both in their adherents and in their activities.
Figure 1 Military Families Speak Out
Note: Activists prepare to march against the Iraq War near Fort Bragg in Fayetteville, North Carolina, on March 19, 2005. distribution.
Adherents to other leading organizations categorically reject the Democratic Party, including the International Social Organization (ISO), Troops Out Now (TON), and the Communist Party. These organizations actively promote alternatives to the Democratic Party in the political system. At the same time, organizations like Peace Action (PA), Not in Our Name (NION), and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) contact individuals who are roughly similar to the movement as a whole in terms of their partisan orientations. These organizations are most likely to experience internal struggles about whether their organizations should pursue partisan or nonpartisan means to ending the war (Blee & Currier, 2006) .
We derive the network of antiwar activists, reported in Figure 2 , from the co-contacts by organizations in our data. Each shape (or "node") represents Table 1 .
distribution.
an organization that contacted individuals to attend antiwar protest events. Two organizations are connected with a line (or "link") in this network if they contacted the same individual to attend a protest event, with thicker lines denoting more co-contacts. We use the spring-embedding algorithm in Netdraw 2.046 to position organizations close to one another in the network if they have a similar pattern of contacts with activists. Nodes are scaled in size to the number of contacts that they have with activists; larger nodes reflect more contacts. For the 20 most active organizations, we indicate the name of the organization to the right of the node and depict the partisan leaning with shape and color. 5 Organizations that are not connected to the main component of the network are placed on the periphery of the network. Black squares represent Democratic-leaning organizations, gray triangles favor third parties, and white circles have no significant partisan bias.
Examination of Figure 2 reveals that organizations cluster in the network based on their partisan leanings. Strongly Democratic-leaning organizations cluster in the north central part of the network, with MoveOn.org, PDA, MFSO, and Code Pink grouped closely together. Nonpartisan organizations-notably, ANSWER, NION, and UFPJ-occupy the center of the network. Thirdparty-leaning organizations are positioned to the left of center. These findings support our hypothesis that partisanship plays a role in structuring the network of antiwar activists. Organizations are drawn close to one another in the network in part based on the partisan or nonpartisan leanings of their activists. These networks provide the basis for collective actions that define the nature of the movement's activities (McAdam, 1986 ).
Choosing to Lobby Congress
We argue that partisan attitudes shape the ways that individuals participate in the antiwar movement. In this section, we test this hypothesis using data from the 694 surveys we conducted at the September 24-26, 2005, antiwar protest (September 24), activist training (September 25), and Capitol Hill Lobby Day (September 26). We discuss the evolving tactics of the movement, present our methods, and explain the results of our data analysis. seemed to be swayed by demonstrations alone, even those involving hundreds of thousands of people. In response to the unprecedented, coordinated worldwide rallies on February 15, 2003 , for example, President Bush remarked that he would not base policy on the opinions of a "focus group" (Stevenson, 2003) .
With President Bush's reelection in 2004, more activists began to explore new, creative ways to voice opposition to the Iraq War. The most publicly visible of these efforts was Cindy Sheehan's 26-day vigil outside of President Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas, during August 2005 (Smith, 2005) . Other activists began an aggressive campaign of counter-recruitment to undercut the military's ability to replenish the troops in Iraq as well as acts of civil disobedience, such as sit-ins in congressional offices and disruptions of congressional hearings. These campaigns reflected an expanded repertoire of tactics by movement actors but commonly retained emphasis on an "outside" strategy toward seeking influence (Kollman, 1998) .
Although many antiwar activists continue to prefer outside strategies, others see the value of inside tactics, especially lobbying. In May 2005, UFPJ formed a legislative-action working group under the leadership of Gael Murphy of Code Pink and Van Gosse of Historians Against the War (Murphy, 2005) . Leading organizations involved in the group included the Progressive Democrats of America, the Institute of Policy Studies, Peace Action, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, and Brooklyn Parents for Peace. The main goal of the working group was to systematize lobbying efforts that had been conducted only sporadically to date. More specifically, the group was tasked with planning a grassroots-advocacy training day on September 25 and a Capitol Hill Lobby Day on September 26, to follow a large-scale demonstration planned for Washington, DC, on September 24.
Model
We are interested in how the partisan attitudes of antiwar activists affected their willingness to participate in the Capitol Hill Lobby Day. Does partisanship matter for which activists pursue insider tactics in addition to outsider tactics? We assess which factors contributed to individual decisions to participate in the lobby day by comparing the responses of street protesters on September 24 with those of grassroots lobbyists on September 25 and 26.
We develop a probit model in which the dependent variable takes the value of one if we observed the respondent at the training session for the lobby day or the lobby day itself, zero otherwise. To account for missing data, we use the Amelia II multiple imputation routine (King, Honaker, Joseph, & Scheve, 2001) . We model the decision to lobby as a product of the individual's political involvement, source of information, reason for participating, and demographics.
Political involvement is indicated in the model by four variables: Democrat, organizational membership, network centrality, and thousands of miles traveled (a measure of political commitment). Democrat takes the value of one if the respondent wrote that she or he considers herself or himself to be a member of the Democratic Party and zero otherwise. We expect that self-identified Democrats are more likely to participate in lobbying, other things being equal, because they are more likely to believe in the efficacy of working with formal political institutions than are non-Democrats (which, in our sample, are third-party identifiers and independents). The coefficient on this variable is the focus of this regression, as its significance and direction constitutes a test of our second hypothesis.
Organizational membership takes the value of one if the respondent indicated membership in any civic, community, labor, or political organization and zero otherwise. We expect that organizational membership increases the likelihood of lobbying because these organizations socialize political engagement and teach skills that facilitate involvement in institutional politics (Clemens, 1997; McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Skocpol, 2003) . Network centrality is based on how close the respondent is to the network of contacting organizations, with greater weight given to contacts with more central organizations (Bonacich, 1987) . We expect that individuals central to the network are more likely to lobby because they have greater access to information and interact with more involved participants than do less central individuals (L. C. Freeman, 1979) . Thousands of miles traveled are calculated based on the number of miles between a respondent's home and Washington, DC. We expect that individuals who travel greater distances will be more likely to lobby because, other things being equal, they have higher levels of commitment than activists who travel short distances and because they may be more inclined to "make the most" of a long trip than activists from nearby.
We expect that an individual's source of information significantly affects how she or he thinks about participation in the movement, though we do not specify the direction of the effect for particular sources of information (Andrews & Biggs, 2006) . Similarly, we expect that an individual's reason for participating in the antiwar movement affects the likelihood of lobbying participation, but we do not specify the direction of these effects. We expect that participation differs significantly according to sex, race, and occupational prestige because movement organizations may relate differently to distribution. marginalized subgroups than to more advantaged constituents within their ranks (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Strolovitch, 2006; Verba et al., 1995) . 6 Finally, we expect that older individuals are more likely to lobby because they have more time, disposable income and political experience than do younger individuals (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993) .
Results
Consistent with our second hypothesis, individuals identifying themselves as Democrats were significantly more likely to participate in the lobby day than were non-Democrats, other things being equal.
7 As reported in Table 2 , Democrats were 11% more likely than non-Democrats to participate in the lobby day when all other variables are held at their means (for continuous variables) or their modes (for dichotomous variables). This result indicates that Democrats were more likely to engage in one specific type of highly institutionalized movement activity. However, it does not indicate that Democrats were more likely to participate in all forms of movement activity. For example, we suspect that non-Democrats are more likely to engage in noninstitutionalized forms of movement activity, such as civil disobedience, than are Democrats. Our data do not speak to this particular question, however, so it must be left to future research. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that partisanship affects how, but not necessarily how much, individuals participate in the activities of a social movement.
The results demonstrate that other political involvement variables serve as significant predictors of participation in the lobby day. Individuals who are members of at least one civic, community, labor, or political organization are 17% more likely to engage in lobbying than those who are not. The significant, positive coefficient on the network centrality variable indicates that the more connected activists are to others, then the more likely they are to lobby, regardless of their partisan identity. These two findings are especially interesting in light of recent literature on the emergence of "checkbook" organizations (cf. Skocpol, 2003 ), because they demonstrate the relevance both of membership in these organizations as well their direct contacts with adherents. Finally, as expected, individuals who travel from greater distances are significantly more likely to participate in lobbying than those to come to the protest from a nearby location.
Sources of information, reasons for participating, and demographics all make a difference in an individual's decision to lobby Congress. Individuals who learn about an event through an organizational contact are 13% more distribution.
likely to lobby, whereas those who learn about events through the mass media are 16% less likely to do so. Individuals who come to a protest with an explicit political objective (such as "strengthening the antiwar movement" or "electing a Democratic Congress") are 15% more likely to lobby, whereas Thousands of miles traveled were computed using http://www.mapquest.com. Occupation prestige was computed using Nam-Powers-Boyd Occupational Status Scale for the year 2000 (Nam & Boyd, 2004) . Note: dF/dX signifies a change in the predicted probability, given a one-unit change in X, holding all other variables at their means (for continuous variables) or modes (for categorical variables). Dependent variable = 1 if participated in Capitol Hill Lobby Day. SE = standard error; SD = standard deviation. Mean of the dependent variable (P) = 0.29; number of observations (N) = 694; number of imputed data sets = 5; number of simulations (M) = 1,000. * denotes statistical significance at the .05 level.
distribution.
those who show up principally to express anti-Bush sentiment or for personal reasons (such as "to be with friends" ) are 17% and 11% less likely to lobby, respectively. Age influences participation, with each birthday adding about 1% to an individual's willingness to lobby when all other variables are held at their means or modes. The average age of lobbyists was 51, and the average age of street protesters was 41. Overall, the age distribution is distinctly bimodal, with peaks at age 23 and age 54. The contemporary antiwar movement is a composed mainly of the young (18 to 27) and the old (46 to 67), with relatively fewer participants outside these ranges. Finally, we did not find that sex, race, or occupational prestige make a difference in an individual's propensity to lobby. 
Gaining Access to Congress
We argue that partisanship matters not only for how the movement behaves but also for how the institutions of government respond to it. In this section, we test this hypothesis using data on which congressional offices received a lobbying visit from antiwar lobbyists on Capitol Hill Lobby Day. We discuss the considerations involved in meeting with antiwar activists, present our methods and data analysis, and explain the implications for the movement.
Calculating a Position on the Iraq War
If members of Congress are indeed single-minded seekers of reelection, as Mayhew (1974) (Stein, 2005) . With an increasing number of American soldiers dying in Iraq and public opinion turning against the war, it seemed that Democrats might be able to use the war to make gains in the 2006 congressional elections. However, the fact that Republicans had regularly beaten them on this issue in the past several years left many Democrats skittish about taking a stand about the war (VandeHei & Murray, 2005) .
distribution.
A sizable number of Democrats began to organize opposition to the war in June 2005 when California Representatives Maxine Waters, Lynn Woolsey, and Barbara Lee led the formation of the Out of Iraq Congressional Caucus (Billings, 2005) . The caucus was founded with 50 members and had grown to 66 members by the Capitol Hill Lobby Day (Martin, 2005) . Along with growing support for Lynn Woolsey's resolution calling for a plan to withdraw from Iraq (which received yes votes from five Republicans) and Nancy Pelosi's resolution calling for a "strategy for success" in Iraq, the caucus signaled that Democrats were beginning to see an antiwar position as something other than electoral suicide. At the same time, the antiwar position remained the minority position within Congress and within the Democratic Party.
Given conditions of uncertainty about how voters were likely to vote on the Iraq War in 2006, meetings with antiwar lobbyists could potentially provide useful indicators of constituent sentiments. At the same time, the meetings could prove to be a waste of time, or even a public relations embarrassment, for members who had supported the war. By examining which offices granted access to antiwar lobbyists, we gain insight into how members of Congress and their staffs viewed the antiwar movement.
Model
We attended the Capitol Hill Lobby Day and, in conjunction with UFPJ, observed which of the 535 congressional offices received visits from antiwar lobbyists.
We estimated a probit model in which the dependent variable takes the value of one if the member's office received a visit and zero otherwise. The focus of our analysis is on whether the partisan identity of the member of Congress affects her or his willingness to meet with antiwar lobbyists. If the antiwar movement has no systematic relationship with the Democratic Party, then the chances of a Democratic member meeting with the movement should be no different than that of a Republican member, other things being equal. The majority of Democratic members had supported the war, as had Republicans, making them just as likely to wish to avoid meeting with antiwar lobbyists. If an antiwar position was genuinely nonpartisan, Republican members should have been equally interested in appeasing their constituents on this issue. Conversely, we hypothesize that Democrats were more likely to see the antiwar movement as helping their electoral prospects than were Republicans, other things being equal, and thus more likely to meet with the lobbyists.
distribution.
We control for several alternative explanations for why members of Congress may meet with (or have their staff meet with) antiwar lobbyists. First, we expect that members would be more willing to meet with antiwar lobbyists if they had already expressed support for antiwar positions. This expectation is consistent with the longstanding observation that lobbyists reach out to their friends first and most (Kingdon, 1989) . We construct an index of support for UFPJ's legislative priorities, such as membership in the Out of Iraq Caucus and a vote for the Woolsey Resolution. Second, we expect that members would feel more pressure to meet with antiwar lobbyists if they had a large contingent of local constituents than if they had a small one (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1999) . We measure this variable using the number of participants per state in the lobby day survey. Third, we expect that greater distances between a congressional district and Washington, DC, make it more difficult for grassroots lobbyists to meet their members of Congress in Washington. Finally, we expect that Senate offices are more likely than House offices to meet with antiwar lobbyists because they represent a broader constituency and are more electorally vulnerable (Lee & Oppenheimer, 1999) .
Results
The results of the probit regression (reported in Table 3 ) support the hypothesis that Democratic members of Congress are more likely to meet with antiwar lobbyists than are Republicans, other things being equal. In total, antiwar lobbyists held meetings with 150 Democrats, 113 Republicans, and 2 Independents, for a split of 57% to 43% to less than 1%. Holding other variables at their means (for continuous variables) or modes (for dichotomous variables), Democratic offices were 11% more likely to meet with antiwar lobbyists than were Republicans. This finding implies that Democrats are more likely to believe that the antiwar lobbyists are politically informative than are Republicans. At the same time, we must underscore that the movement held meetings with several prominent Republican lawmakers, such as Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana. In general, though, Republican offices were more likely to believe that meeting with antiwar lobbyists would be politically damaging or simply a waste of time.
Partisanship was not the only factor that affected the access of the antiwar movement to members of Congress. First, members of Congress who had previously expressed high levels of support for antiwar positions were more likely to meet with lobbyists than those whose support had been weak or nonexistent. Second, lobbyists were more likely to gain access to a member's office when the state's antiwar contingent was large. Members' offices were generally less willing to meet with lobbyists not representing their state or to meet with small delegations of lobbyists. 9 Third, the more distant that a member's district was from Washington, DC, the less likely it was to hold a meeting, most likely because of the difficultly local activists had in arranging the visit. Finally, we did not observe a statistically significant difference between members of the House and Senate in their willingness to meet with activists.
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Implications
The antiwar movement's first lobby day did not lead Congress to vote to bring the troops home. However, activists did report measurable success in achieving their objectives. For example, one of the objectives of the day was to convince members of Congress to join the Out of Iraq Caucus. Two new members joined the caucus immediately as a result of meetings with grassroots lobbyists (Lois Caps and Brad Miller), whereas caucus leaders reported a "surge of interest" as a result of the day (Udry, 2005) . Other (Udry, 2005) . The movement held additional lobby days on May 22, 2006, and January 29, 2007 (shown in Figure  3 ), in part with the assistance of a newly hired, paid professional staff member. Thus, lobbying has become a regularized part of the movement's repertoire that applies a moderate amount of pressure to members of Congress.
A Party in the Street
Although a social movement as a whole may not pursue a partisan course, this research establishes that a sizeable percentage of social movement activists maintain dual loyalties to the movement and to a major political party. These loyalties are neither coincidental nor unrelated to one another. Rather, they are both integral to the way these "movement-partisans" participate in politics. The movement-partisans tend to join organizations with others who share their leanings and are more likely to choose institutionalized modes of participation, such as lobbying, whereby they gain access to elected officials who share their partisan identification. An important question is whether these actors play any special role either in the social movement or in the political party.
The role of the movement-partisans can be conceptualized as that of a "party in the street." We define a party in the street as a coordinated, though informal, network of activists and organizations that simultaneously maintain loyalty to and involvement within a major political party and a social movement. We represent this idea in Figure 4 . The intersecting circles contain three regions: (a) on the right, the mainstream political party that rejects the social movement; (b) on the left, the radical social movement that rejects party politics; and (c) in the center, the party in the street that embraces both the social movement and the political party. In the case of the contemporary antiwar movement, the party in the street is the set of black squares clustered in the north central region of Figure 2 . Within this space, organizations like MoveOn.org, PDA, MFSO, and Code Pink are the primary points of connection between the antiwar movement and the Democratic Party.
Rather than attempt to create a movement party-as would be a likely strategy in Europe-the party in the street is an informal way to bring movement politics into a major party. This strategy is potentially viable because, as Sorauf (1968, pp. 11-12) explains, American party structures are "mixed, varied, and even contradictory" and operate according to the principles of an "open, inclusive, semi-public political organization." Access to the party is not only attained formally through elected officials and paid employees of party organizations but also through informal networks of campaign consultants, lobbyists, financial contributors, and activists (Monroe, 2001; Schwartz, 1990) . Movement-partisans have opportunities to join party networks, although they depend on grassroots networks for influence rather than on financial prowess. MoveOn.org, PDA, and like-minded organizations start by connecting to the periphery of these networks. If they remain well organized and attract enthusiastic young activists, then the mainstream political party is unable to ignore them for long.
We do not claim that the party in the street has equal standing with the party in government, the party in the electorate, or the party as organization, as they have been traditionally conceptualized (Key, 1964) . We are not asserting that the formal party organization is coordinating these activities. The party in the street lacks the stability possessed by other parts of the party because it is not supported by enduring institutions. Furthermore, it is small relative to other parts of the party and at times may be virtually nonexistent. However, at certain moments in history, the party in the street may be a critical element in the paths taken by a political party and a social movement.
The 2006 congressional elections and their aftermath afford an example of the party in the street in action. Movement-partisans were highly involved in supporting antiwar candidates, such as Jim Webb of Virginia, now a member of the Senate who is expected to be a public face for the antiwar movement (Craig & Shear, 2006) . During the campaign, movement-partisans worked closely with antiwar members of Congress, such as Barbara Lee, Jim McGovern, John Murtha, and Lynn Woolsey, in crafting positions and planning strategies. When the election returns came in and the Democrats reclaimed control of the House and Senate, media accounts widely attributed the victory to public dissatisfaction with the Iraq War (Grunwald, 2006) . Speaker-Elect Nancy Pelosi took these interpretations to heart, naming John Murtha as her choice for House Majority Leader (over next-in-line Steny Hoyer) because of his opposition to the war and work with the antiwar movement (Wiseman, 2006) . Murtha was defeated for the post, in part because of questions about his reputation on ethics issues. Yet the fact that the Speaker-Elect pushed Murtha for the slot reflected a major turnabout in the fortunes of antiwar activists. Their radical position had quickly become mainstream as prominent members of Congress now lined up to denounce the war (Levey, 2007) . We expect that movement-partisans will enjoy increased access to Democratic leaders throughout the 110th Congress. When the Democratic National Convention opens in Denver in 2008, we suspect that movement-partisans will find their place as convention delegates, in caucuses, and in informal gatherings sponsored by organizations like PDA.
The success of Democrats in the 2006 midterm elections has important implications for the organizations within the antiwar movement. With the Democrats in power again and a changed climate of debate on the war, some formerly partisan activists may be willing to reengage with the Democratic Party through the party in the street. This willingness may shift the energy of the movement toward greater lobbying and away from the preferred tactics of many nonpartisans and third-party adherents.
Conclusion
As a group, antiwar activists are neither wholehearted supporters of the Democratic Party nor skeptics who categorically reject the instrumental value of partisan organizations. They are a heterogeneous mix of activists who disagree, often passionately, about the best means of advocating for the end of the American occupation of Iraq. Individuals and organizations tend to segregate into segments of the movement that share their political views. This segregation allows some parts of the movement to undertake highly partisan activities, whereas other parts of the movement pursue an unabashedly nonpartisan or third-party course. The partisans are likely to adopt different tactics, such as lobbying, than are the nonpartisans. Democratic congressional offices see enough partisan value in the antiwar movement that they are beginning to recognize it as an organized constituency interest within the party (cf. Greenstone, 1969) .
The findings of this research suggest that the current separation between the study of political parties and social movements comes at a cost. Social distribution.
movements are key points of political involvement for many individuals who identify with a major political party. They see the movement as a way of achieving their partisan goals, whether they relate to defeating the other major party at the ballot box or to molding the agenda of their home party to their taste. Political leaders recognize the potential value of the movement to their goals and, thus, are willing to grant access to activists on the basis of partisanship. Likewise, political parties are a factor in the dynamics of social movements. When some leading organizations in a movement have a clear partisan bias and other leading organizations unambiguously reject partisanship, the seeds of strategic and tactical disagreements are sown.
Our research establishes that the intersection between parties and social movements is a significant space, which we have labeled the party in the street. Future research might fruitfully address several additional questions about this phenomenon. First, is the party in the street limited to the Democratic Party, or is it also an important part of Republican politics? Although there are significant cultural and organizational differences between the formal and informal structures of the two major parties (J. Freeman, 1986) , we believe that the party in the street matters to the Republican Party too. The activities of the Christian Right movement may provide at least one significant example of a party in the street within the Republican Party, even if its organizational processes and tactics differ from those of the antiwar movement. Second, how does the party in the street grow and shrink over time? What are the mechanisms that select some movementpartisans as party leaders-like John F. Kerry from the anti-Vietnam-War movement or Ralph Reed from the Christian Right movement-while rejecting others? Third, is the development of the social movement advanced or stymied by its intersection with the party? What factors explain whether movements tend to be co-opted quickly or whether they substantially promote their objectives through the party? Further research along these lines would go a long way toward deepening our understanding of the dynamic intersection between political parties and social movements. The high response rates are likely because of several factors. First, individuals who show up at protests have self-selected as wanting to express their opinions on the subject of the war. The survey is one more opportunity for such people to express themselves and to feel like someone is listening to them. Second, protests are, for the most part, very boring events. Most of the time is spent standing around waiting for the crowd to move and for the action to begin. Protesters literally have little better to do than to complete a survey. Third, because respondents are selected publicly, in front of their peers, there may be informal peer pressure to participate in the survey, which is considered a normatively desirable thing to do in this context. When some individuals refused, they were verbally sanctioned by those standing distribution.
deletion to eliminate the 31 cases that had missing data. We find that listwise deletion produces results that are not significantly different from those produced using multiple imputation. 9. Our observations at the lobby day suggest that the state, rather than the congressional district, is the unit of analysis that congressional staff members use when deciding to grant a meeting. Although members of the House technically represent a specific district, they nonetheless recognize that residents of a state have connections to more than one district through employment, education, family, or political relationships. Thus, they are usually willing to grant meetings to activists from the same state who do not live in the member's district proper if there is another kind of plausible connection.
